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Abstract
Constitutions have many dimensions. These dimensions include at least the 
following:
•  an economic constitution in the sense of a set of rules for exchange of value and 
authority, 
• an interfunctional constitution that allows for the integration of various social 
values, 
• a political constitution that reflects the cultural and democratic integrity of a 
group of people, 
• a legal and judicial constitution that provides rules for the making of other rules, 
and for determining supremacy and the scope of judicial application of rules,
• a human rights constitution that limits the sphere of governmental authority, and
• a redistributive constitution founded on social solidarity.  
The WTO constitution has already grown along some of these dimensions.  As we 
assess the constitutional development of the WTO, we must first analyze these 
dimensions separately.  Second, we must examine how these dimensions relate to one 
another.  Third, we must examine how these dimensions of the WTO “constitution” relate 
to the general international legal system’s constitution.  Finally, we must examine how 
these dimensions of the WTO “constitution” relate to the domestic constitutions of the 
WTO’s member states.  
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2Introduction
Constitutional discourse may foreclose possibilities, or it may expand 
possibilities.  This paper focuses on the ways in which constitutional discourse may 
enable us to see possibilities at the WTO, and more broadly in international society, that 
might not otherwise be apparent.  However, it must be recognized that constitutional 
discourse has a dark side:  the possibility of false necessity and false rigidity that may 
come of assertions that certain legal rules are constitutional and therefore are above 
politics.  
A constitution is like the fabled elephant at the hands of six blind men.2  Each 
imagines a different animal based on his encounter with a different part of the elephant.  
To grapple with the constitutional structure of the WTO, it is necessary to recognize the 
different parts of the elephant, and then to try to envision the entire animal.   Each part is 
important in itself, but cannot be assessed separately from the whole. Thus, the 
evaluative process presented in this paper is analytical and then synthetic.  
There are those who touch a constitution, and only perceive one of the following:  
1. an economic constitution in the sense of a set of rules for exchange of value and 
authority, 
2. an interfunctional constitution that allows for the integration of various social 
values,
3. a political constitution that reflects the cultural and democratic integrity of a group 
of people, 
4. a legal and judicial constitution that provides rules for the making of other rules, 
and for determining supremacy and the scope of application of rules,
5. a human rights constitution that limits the sphere of governmental authority, and
6. a redistributive constitution founded on social solidarity.  
In fact, like the organs of an animal, each of these components is inextricably 
intertwined and interdependent with the others.  It is this essay’s goal to begin to suggest
the outlines of the whole animal.  It is hoped to suggest some of the sinews and systems 
that link the different parts.  We must recognize that while the WTO is a young animal 
that needs all of its organs to survive, some will grow with age.  This is complicated 
enough.
Yet we must also recognize that the WTO constitution is itself but a part  of a 
broader structure for the global system.  Not only are there several elephants in our 
picture, but these elephants live in symbiosis, sharing organs with one another.  Thus, we 
would again be missing the whole picture if we focused exclusively on the WTO 
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3constitution.  Rather, it is necessary to examine the WTO constitution in the context of 
the general public international law system, and in relation to the other components of 
that system.  Indeed, the general public international law system, including its 
subsystems, must be evaluated in constitutional terms.
The WTO constitution is a semi-autonomous system within the broader 
international legal system.3  But due to its dependence on and interaction with the broader 
international legal system, it is not possible to analyze the WTO constitution fully 
without analyzing the broader structure.4 This would be as incomplete as analyzing the 
constitution of Massachusetts without examining the U.S. federal constitution, although it 
is not precisely analogous.  A complete analysis would include the relationship between 
the WTO legal system and the broader international legal system.  
Furthermore, the WTO interacts with, draws support from, and constrains 
domestic constitutional orders.  So we must examine the WTO constitution not only in 
relation to the broader international legal system, but also in relation to the domestic 
constitutional structures of the member states of the WTO.  Again, it is incorrect to 
criticize the WTO for constitutional weaknesses or excesses where these are addressed by 
constitutional structures at the member state level.  But we must also examine the extent 
to which WTO law may inhibit constitutional structures at the member state level, and 
consequently examine whether this inhibition should be stopped, or whether it may be 
better to effect the relevant constitutional function at the WTO level.  Thus, “negative” 
constitutional integration—inhibition of domestic constitutional functions—must be 
countered with “positive” constitutional integration:  establishment of constitutional 
structures at the WTO level.  
Finally, while comparison between the WTO “constitution” and domestic 
constitutions is useful for this very reason, it must be approached with great caution, as 
these constitutions exist in sharply different social contexts, with sharply different 
functions.  
So, we have a minimum of three intertwined “elephants.”  The constitutional 
structures at each of the domestic, WTO and general international legal system levels 
relate to one another.5  The question of the relationship among the state, the WTO and the 
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4general international legal system constitutions may be understood as one of subsidiarity:  
at what level are particular constitutional functions best effected?  We can begin to 
perceive a principle of constitutional subsidiarity.  This is different from the normal 
principle of subsidiarity, which may be understood as a principle of allocation of 
authority, thereby addressing only one element of constitutionalization.  The principle of 
constitutional subsidiarity deals not with primary rules, but with secondary rules, and 
asks at which level, and in which functional setting, constitutional functions should be 
effected.  
While the state and the WTO might be understood as existing in a vertical 
relationship, we might understand the WTO and the general international legal system as 
existing in either a vertical or a horizontal relationship.6 But the allocations are not static.  
They are dynamic in a variety of ways, both formal and informal.  So in order to 
understand each individual structure, and in order to understand the contingent nature of 
each individual structure, it is necessary to analyze the dynamic basis for allocation of 
authority among these subsystems.
One might well ask, at the conclusion of this analytical and synthetic process, is 
there anything essential about any of these animals?  Perhaps an elephant has an essence, 
but does a constitution?  Is this where the elephant analogy thankfully stops?  To press it 
one step further, this essay suggests that, in evolutionary terms, the constitutional 
elephant evolves for the benefit of its cells:  the individual constituents.  The point is that 
the constitution does not exist as some essential form in itself, but rather evolves as an 
instrument for the benefit of individual constituents.  Thus, this essay rejects corporatist 
or other approaches that suggest that constitutionalization has intrinsic value, and 
embraces the contingency and plasticity of constitutions.  
The Language of the WTO Constitution Debate
Defining terms can enhance debate.  And few legal terms engender more 
misunderstanding than “constitution.”  It is difficult to say what is the core meaning of 
“constitution,” and what is a trope.  Anthropologists say that we only see what we know, 
and in this sense we are all partially blind as we approach a constitution.  In discussions 
of constitutions, each analyst arrives with a culturally-rooted image that obscures the full 
structure.  Therefore, it is not only unacceptable, but impossible, to speak about a WTO 
“constitution,” either with compatriots or with foreigners.7  Yet in two important ways, it 
is necessary to try to do so.  
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5First, the WTO already has a constitution—in the same sense that the EU had a 
constitution before the recent constitutional convention and just as the U.S. Articles of 
Confederation were, indeed, a constitution. To pretend that there is no constitution in this 
rather technical sense is to pretend that the emperor has no clothes.  Yet viewing the 
WTO in constitutional terms is especially difficult for United States citizens, as the U.S. 
Constitution is constitutive of a particular domestic society, and, more than any other 
constitution, has attained iconic, even deified, significance.  We also have difficulty 
accepting multiple overlapping constitutions, as we in the U.S. associate our own 
constitution with a kind of exclusive allegiance, and sovereignty.  Yet reality requires 
recognition of multiple sovereignties, multiple allegiances and multiple constitutions.  
Indeed, we in the U.S., like those in the EU, should be more prepared than others to 
accept the ambiguities involved in multiple constitutions.8
In the U.S. and EU systems of dual constitutions, at the local and at the central 
levels, a third type of rule has developed in the H.L.A. Hart hierarchy.9  Primary rules are 
normal legislation.  Secondary rules are more in the nature of constitutional rules, 
determining authority to legislate, interpret and determine conflicts between primary 
rules.  But there can also be conflicts between secondary rules.  A special type of 
secondary rule, or perhaps one would call it a “tertiary rule,” determines the allocation of 
authority between constitutions.10 The principle of constitutional subsidiarity, suggested 
above, might be understood as a kind of tertiary rule.  But there may be others, and they 
may be more specific.  Even in systems like the U.S., where it is now generally 
recognized that the central constitution is supreme, there is an inter-constitutional 
dialogue, carried on by both courts and legislatures, that in a nuanced manner allocates 
authority between state constitutions and the federal constitution.  This type of dialogue 
has been extensive and explicit in the EU.11  There is also a nascent dialogue between the 
U.S. Constitution and the international legal “constitution.”12
Implicit in this concept of “tertiary rules” is the non-exclusivity of 
constitutionalization.  That is, it is possible to have multiple levels and locations at which 
constitutionalization takes place.  The nation-state holds no monopoly.  The principle of 
exclusive sovereignty has never been true.13 This non-exclusivity may be associated with 
the non-exclusivity of levels and locations in which people relate to one another:  with 
8
   Walker, supra  note 5.
9
   H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).   Hart wrote of three types of secondary 
rule: rules of recognition, rules of change, and rules of adjudication.  
10
   For a similar suggestion, see Colin Hugh Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues of 
Law:  A Doctrinal Framework Based on Rules of Recognition, Jurisdiction, and Legal 
History, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 875, 903-906 (1987).  
11 See, e.g., Solange I (BVerfGE 37, 271); Solange II (BVerfGE 73, 339), Maastricht 
(Bverf 89, 155).  
12 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box:  
Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989 (2004).
13 STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:  ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
6subsidiarity.  It is in this sense that the non-exclusivity of constitutionalization seems 
congruent with the non-exclusivity of political relations.  
Second, the WTO will increasingly need to draw on constitutional functions along 
all of the parameters assessed here.  This is because the relationships that the WTO 
addresses will increase in scope, complexity, and importance, and will therefore drive 
and benefit from constitutional growth.14 These constitutional functions will become 
necessary despite the concern many citizens and diplomats have about 
constitutionalization of the WTO.  However, once we analyze the term “constitution”, it 
will be seen that there is less to fear than if we imagine the kind of iconic or mystical 
constitution that many believe can only occur at the level of the state.  Renato Ruggiero, 
former Director-General of the WTO, was famously criticized for using the term 
“constitution” in reference to the WTO.15
Third, it is not a contradiction to say that when the WTO needs constitutional 
functions, those functions may be effected elsewhere.  As we imagine the WTO 
constitution, we must recognize that it is a component of a broader global “constitution.”  
The broader global constitution is in most respects an unwritten constitution—consisting 
largely of customary international law—but it consists of those rules of secondary 
international law that may be understood as “constitutional.”  These include, but are not 
limited to, “secondary” rules that determine how primary rules are made, including the 
rules of custom and the rules of treaty.  Much analytical detail would be lost in imagining 
the WTO as a wholly separate system.  Rather, accurate analysis requires, in most cases, 
consideration of the WTO within its broader context.   It is ignorant to decry the gaps in 
the WTO “constitution” without examining to what extent these gaps may be filled by the 
global “constitution.”
By referring to all these phenomena as “constitutional”, do we risk losing 
analytical focus or normative content?  Perhaps others would argue that one or another of 
the facets of constitutionalization described here is the “real” constitutionalization, and 
that the “real” constitutionalization is diluted by inclusion of other facets.  However, the 
analysis here suggests that none of these facets may be considered alone, and this paper’s 
theoretical perspective rejects the kind of peremptory value ascribed by some authors to 
human rights generally, to the integrity of a “people” or even to political legitimacy per 
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7se.  It finds the facet often emphasized in legal literature—direct effect, supremacy and 
judicial review—to be rather narrow.  It also recognizes the merely instrumental value of 
the allocation of legislative and judicial authority.  
More importantly, by ascribing constitutional significance to features of the 
WTO, do we risk diminishing the state as an existing “constitutional” community?  If the 
present essay can de-mystify the components of constitutionalization, perhaps it can allay 
fears that something essential (but unidentifiable) will be lost by ascribing constitutional 
significance to some features of the WTO.  It will be seen that the WTO does not 
necessarily compete with the state for loyalty; rather it will and should coexist with the 
state.  Importantly, if the WTO and the state were true to the theoretical structure set out 
here, the WTO would do no more than support the state in carrying out the state’s
mandate to better the lot of individual constituents.16
This essay is intended to add to the existing literature regarding the WTO 
“constitution”17 by broadening the discussion to include issues beyond  human rights, 
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8federalism and inter-judicial relations, and, more importantly, to begin to draw the 
relationship among the different facets of the WTO constitution and its development.  
This paper seeks to ground its understanding of these developments in the theory of 
constitutional economics.18
Constitutions, Constitutionalism, Constitutionalization and Metrics
Of course, constitutions have different roles and meanings in different social 
settings.  Moreover, as societies change, the type of constitution that may have been 
optimal at one point in time may no longer be desirable.19
“Constitutionalism” refers to a position advocating more or greater constitutional 
structure:  advocating constitutionalization.  However, in order to define the goal of 
constitutionalism, we need a metric of constitutionalization.  How would we know when 
constitutional structure is increased or reduced?  If, as this paper suggests, there are 
multiple dimensions of constitutionalization, how do we relate these different dimensions 
to one another in measuring constitutionalization?  Perhaps even more importantly, is it 
possible to know when constitutionalization is normatively attractive—whether
constitutionalism is normatively sound?
Methodological individualism would recognize that the central feature of 
constitutionalization is sharing power.  So, we may develop a metric for 
constitutionalization in terms of the degree to which constitutional arrangements result in 
shared authority.  Yet sharing power is by no means always good.  Normative 
individualism answers the normative questions by reference to the individual and his or 
her preferences.  Thus, constitutionalization is attractive where it enhances the ability of 
individuals to achieve their preferences.  These preferences must include altruistic and 
esthetic preferences.  Where constitutionalization does not enhance the ability of 
individuals to achieve their preferences, it is not normatively attractive.  
Constitutionalization is not intrinsically good, but is instrumental to the achievement of 
other values.  
However, as we will see below, there are many parameters of 
constitutionalization to consider, and in a particular setting, institutional intensification—
constitutionalization—might be appropriate in respect of one parameter, but not in 
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9respect of others.  So, one question for the institutional designer—for the constitutional 
draftsman—is how to constitutionalize in some areas but not in others.  This question is 
especially thorny where the boundaries between subject matter areas are difficult to draw.  
Where does “commerce” end and “human rights” begin?  Thus, constitutions like the 
U.S. Constitution and the Treaty of Rome allocate power to regulate interstate and 
international commerce to the center, but the definition of regulation of commerce, and of 
commerce itself, is elastic under pressure.  This elasticity results in a variable allocation 
of authority that is adjustable over time. What is the relationship between allocation of 
legislative authority to the center, and judicial review at the center?  What is the 
relationship between allocation of legislative authority to the center and centralized 
capacity for redistribution?
Finally, constitutionalization must be understood in at least two, and perhaps 
three, dimensions.  In the international setting, this concept has a “levels” problem.  In a 
domestic setting, one central hallmark of constitutionalization is the restraint of the 
state—setting limits on the legislative capacity of the state.  Of course, in this limited 
sense, all international law may be viewed in terms of constitutionalization:  the central 
vocation of international law is to set limits on the legislative capacity of the state.  
Therefore, when we speak of constitutionalization at the WTO, we must be referring to 
something other than restraint of the state.  One feature may be to set limits on the 
legislative capacity of the WTO.  But therein lies a fundamental contradiction.  By setting 
limits on the legislative capacity of the WTO, we would implicitly be reducing the scope 
to set limits on the legislative capacity of the state.  In this potential meaning of 
constitutionalization, constitutionalization at one level is inconsistent with 
constitutionalization at the other level.  We can break out of this conundrum by 
developing a more nuanced understanding of constitutionalization.  This more nuanced 
understanding is not so much concerned with limits, but with capacities.  To what extent 
are the essential tasks that we assign to “constitutions” effected satisfactorily?  At the 
international level, to what extent are constitutional features useful to achieve the goals of 
constituents?  The six features of constitutionalization advanced in this paper should be 
understood in this sense.
Economic Constitutions and Constitutional Moments
Constitutional economics brings a positivist analytical perspective to 
constitutions.  Under this approach, constitutions are simply instruments of human 
interaction:  mechanisms by which to share authority in order to facilitate the 
establishment of rules.  Constitutional rules are not natural law; instead, they are political 
settlements designed to maximize the achievement of individual citizens’ preferences.  In 
a transaction cost or strategic model, constitutions are designed to overcome transaction 
costs or strategic barriers to Pareto superior outcomes.  
Thus, from this perspective, if there were no potential value to be obtained from 
cooperation, constitutions would be unimportant, and would not exist.  Constitutions exist 
to resolve transaction costs and strategic problems that would otherwise prevent the 
achievement of efficient exchanges of authority.  Where there is value to be obtained by 
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agreement, constitutions may be used to facilitate the realization of this value by reducing 
transaction costs and strategic costs, such as the problem of states holding out or 
defecting from their commitments.
For example, one of the central features of the WTO constitution relates to rules 
for the suppression of protectionism.  These rules are thought of as constitutional when, 
like the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, they discipline domestic 
regulation that may create excessive barriers to trade.  In a sense, these rules against 
protectionism are specialized rules of dynamic subsidiarity.  They contingently remove 
power from the state under a specified range of circumstances.  
And yet, these types of adjudicative standards, though constitutional in stature, 
compete with legislative solutions to the same problems.  Legislative solutions—known 
in this context as “positive integration”—might develop regimes of harmonization or 
recognition, or blended regimes of harmonization and recognition, as in the EU “essential 
harmonization” program.  These legislative solutions could enjoy greater political support 
than judicial decisions addressing the same issues. 
It is in this regard that negative integration devices, such as those in the WTO that 
may be used to strike down domestic regulatory regimes, may create demand for positive 
integration devices, such as those associated with majority voting.  Deregulation through 
negative integration may create demand for re-regulation at the central level through 
majority-voting based legislative capacity.  Here we see an important tendon connecting 
economic constitutions with political constitutions.  Majority voting among states might 
give rise to demands for greater democratic legitimacy.  Pascal Lamy, former trade 
Commissioner of the EU, has called for a WTO parliamentary consultative assembly for 
just this reason.20
So the causal chain might appear as follows:
This hypothesized causal chain shows a link between two governance components 
within the economic constitutional category:  adjudication and legislation.  It also shows 
a link between the legislative component and the political constitutions category 
20 http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla55_en.htm .  
See also Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of International Rule-Making:  The 
Political and Normative Context, available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=434420; Richard Falk & Andrew 
Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:  Legitimacy and the Power of 
Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 191 (2000); Robert L. Howse, How to Begin 
to Think About the Democratic Deficit at the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER  (Stephan Griller, ed. 2003).
Perceived protectionismstronger adjudicationperceived imbalance
stronger legislationperceived democratic deficitparliamentary control
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discussed below.  The possibility of centralized legislation is obviously linked to the need 
for centralized democratic accountability.  
Furthermore, a constitution may produce its own demand:  once established, by 
reducing transaction costs and strategic costs of international arrangements, constitutions 
would be expected to make attractive a host of arrangements that were otherwise 
unattractive.   There may be a path dependency characteristic to constitutional 
development, with tipping points that result in lumpy movement or punctuated equilibria.  
Thus, once a centralized legislative and parliamentary feature are established for one 
purpose, it may make it easier to use them for other purposes.
Constitutional economics recognizes the possibility of constitutional moments.  A 
“constitutional moment” in the Buchanan and Tullock sense is an historical moment at 
which a Harsanyian “veil of uncertainty” allows individuals, or in our case states, to 
agree on constitutional change even though they are uncertain of the possible future 
implications.  In fact, it is the uncertainty that facilitates agreement.   Constitutional 
moments generally result from a shift in the concerns, or perception of concerns, of 
constituents.  This perspective explains agreement to secondary rules:  rules such as 
majority voting regimes, or allocations of authority, that determine the ability to make 
primary rules that actually govern behavior.  In this theoretical perspective, states would 
agree on new secondary rules where they are certain enough that they will be benefited in 
the aggregate, but uncertain about how much of the benefit they may capture.  
Constitutional change would be expected to occur when there are shifts in state 
preferences, shifts in the technological or institutional means to achieve those 
preferences, or shifts in states’ perceptions of these things.  What types of shifts might 
result in a future constitutional moment at the WTO?  It is difficult to say, but issues such 
as increasing public awareness and concern about the WTO, pressures from other global 
interests including environmental protection, human rights and health, increasing concern 
regarding global poverty and the role of trade, and fear of terrorism could contribute to a 
tectonic movement at the WTO.  
In the context of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which produced the 
WTO in 1994, we may imagine that the move to stronger dispute settlement resulted 
from a constitutional moment, in which two kinds of trade-offs were made.  
First, the U.S. stipulated that it would not give up unilateralism under Section 301 
of the Trade Act of 1974 unless stronger dispute settlement were established in the WTO.  
This stipulation was intended to end discussion of Section 301, but the U.S.’ principal 
trade partners accepted the challenge.  In the ensuing negotiations, the U.S. gave up the 
right to take unilateral action to enforce its rights under WTO law, in exchange for 
strengthened dispute settlement.  
Second, it was expected that stronger dispute settlement would make 
commitments stronger.  As the commitments are generally consistent with liberalization, 
this would result in greater liberalization.  In 1994, the parties did not know which states 
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would benefit most from stronger dispute settlement.  However, they may plausibly have 
believed that all would benefit to some degree, and been willing to accept the possibility 
that others would benefit more.
We return to the constitutional economics theoretical framework throughout this 
paper.  This theoretical framework, both in normative and positive terms, allows us in the 
first instance to draw together the different components of constitutionalization described 
herein.  We will also refer to more specific connections among the components that can 
make it difficult to constitutionalize along one parameter without constitutionalizing 
along others.  
To summarize, constitutional economics sees constitutions as devices to enhance 
achievement of preferences.  The task of framers of constitutions, and of analysts, is to 
engage in comparative institutional analysis21—even if the reference is historical or 
hypothetical—in order to determine which institutional features will maximize the net 
achievement of preferences.  So, each of the other components of constitutionalization is 
harnessed to this same task.  
Interfunctional Constitutions
Of course, one of the signal problems of the WTO today is its relationship with 
other organizations, other sources of international law, and non-trade values.22 In the 
Hart sense, we need rules for the allocation of authority not among individuals, or states, 
but among functional agents of states.  To the limited extent that the WTO is merely the 
avatar of trade, while for example the ILO is the avatar of labor rights and the UNHCHR 
is the avatar of human rights, we need rules that allocate authority among these agents.  
The relationship between trade values (growth or prosperity) and other values, 
like environmental protection, consumer protection, competition law, bank regulation or 
labor rights (not to mention human rights, discussed separately below), is a critical 
challenge to the WTO.   And the 1994 advance in dispute settlement at the WTO has 
raised concerns about how the WTO deals with multilateral environmental treaties, 
international labor standards and human rights treaties, which often do not have access to 
mandatory dispute settlement.  
Thus, another facet of constitutionalization addresses the extent to which broad 
social values are integrated with one another, and more specifically, the way in which 
market concerns are integrated with non-market concerns.  It is striking that both the U.S. 
and the EC began with emphases on commercial relations, and developed broader 
21 NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1995); Trachtman, supra note 18.  
22 See Oren Perez, The Many Faces of the Trade-Environment Conflict:  Some Lessons 
for the Constitutionalisation Project, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner, eds. 
Hart 2004).
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capacities over time.  It is also striking that each domestic government has the 
institutional capacity to deal with inter-functional trade-offs.  
It is in this sense that constitutionalization is concerned with capacities:  here the 
capacity to integrate diverse values.  Functional subsidiarity counsels against aggregating 
all multilateral power to the WTO, while increasing functional linkages makes some 
kinds of intersectoral coherence useful.23  In order to assess the degree of coherence, we 
must look both within and without the WTO.  
Within the WTO, we can see the development of a modest approach to 
intersectoral coherence in the WTO’s reference to standards promulgated by international 
standards organizations.  We can also see it in the Appellate Body’s Shrimp-Turtle 
decision, which referred to an international environmental agreement in order to assist in 
interpreting some of the exceptional provisions of the WTO Agreements.  But the 
international community may need to develop more complete and predictable 
mechanisms to promote coherence between trade policy and other policies.  These will 
not necessarily result in uniform enforceability of all international law.  States need 
flexibility to create both harder and softer international law.  This counsels against 
blanket calls for direct effect of WTO law in domestic legal orders,24 and for the 
enforcement of other international law in WTO dispute settlement.
Developing countries have been reluctant to bring human rights, labor rights, or 
environmental protection inside the WTO more directly, for fear that social clauses will 
be used as bases for protectionism.  Implicit in this position is the assumption that social 
clauses cannot today be used as bases for protectionism.  In order to advance coherent 
policy-making in these areas, at levels that will satisfy the wealthier states, it will be 
necessary to establish mechanisms to guard against protectionism.  It may also be 
necessary to provide compensation to poorer states in exchange for their willingness to 
accept standards that may otherwise be inappropriate, or simply too costly, for their 
society or level of development.  Compensation could be provided through trade 
liberalization or even through direct monetary settlements.
Outside the WTO, the broader international system responds to the problem of 
coherence, but perhaps in too limited a fashion.  The broader international system is 
characterized by decentralized global lawmaking, and decentralized global adjudication.  
This decentralized system does not satisfactorily respond to the need, under 
circumstances of varying and shifting legislative sources, to resolve conflicts between 
rules.  
Conflicts between rules are the legal face of conflicts between different values.  
The core issue is a choice of law problem, not between states in a horizontal legal order, 
23 See Trachtman, supra note 6.  Howse and Nicolaides, supra note 7, refer to the same 
concept as “horizontal subsidiarity.”  
24
 Joel P. Trachtman & Philip Moremen, Whose Right is it Anyway?  Private Parties in 
EC-U.S. Dispute Settlement at the WTO, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221 (2003)
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nor between component political entities and a central government.  Rather, it is an inter-
functional choice of law problem, between law that arises in different sectors of the 
international legal system, from different functional and institutional contexts.  These 
contexts overlap like tectonic plates, and sometimes collide with one another, causing 
discontinuity and disruption.  
The current structure of the international legal system for dealing with diverse 
legal rules from diverse sources is certainly troublesome, utilizing formal last-in-time 
rules or perhaps a lex specialis rule to address some of the most important normative 
issues faced by international society.  Over the next 50 years, we may expect to see more 
negotiations in an effort to develop more nuanced means to integrate different global 
values, such as trade, environment, and human rights.  These negotiations will result in 
nuanced rules and institutional development.  They will no doubt reduce the 
indeterminacy arising from wide variation in the arrangements for adjudication in 
different subject areas—from functionally decentralized international adjudication.  But 
they will not eliminate it.  After all, states need the flexibility to create norms of varying 
binding force.  Thus, we can expect development of the interfunctional constitution both 
within and without the WTO legal system.
Interfunctional constitutions can also be understood in terms of constitutional 
economics.  Interfunctional constitutions facilitate intersectoral tradeoffs among different 
categories of preferences.  In terms of the theory of the firm, they bring within a single 
institution the different categories of preferences that otherwise would intersect in the 
market of the general international legal system.  This theoretical perspective provides a 
ready understanding that there will be some functional areas that should be addressed 
together within a single international organization, and others that will be better 
addressed separately.25
Constitutions of Politics, Democracy, Legitimacy and Subsidiarity
It is obvious but nonetheless important to acknowledge that the WTO will never 
look like a state.  Fortunately, there will never be WTO anthems or a pledge of allegiance 
to the WTO, even in economics classrooms.   Constitutions are associated by some with 
nationhood, or better, peoplehood.  Joseph Weiler points out that the European Union 
itself lacks a “constitutional demos,” and so is not rooted in a central federal-type 
power.26   The WTO has much less of a constitutional demos.  Could a pretense of this 
25
   For arguments regarding the scope if issues that might be addressed within the WTO, 
see Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 
(2004). 
26
   Joseph H.H. Weiler, Federalism and Constitutionalism:  Europe’s Sonderweg, Jean 
Monnet Paper No. 10/00, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/001001.html; See also Jurgen Habermas, 
So, Why Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 11 New Left Review, September-October 
2001.
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type of constitution at the WTO level result in a hollowing of the real constitutional 
politics of the state?  
Notwithstanding this shared concern for maintaining local identity and coherence, 
many cosmopolitans wish for a sense of global solidarity and social justice.  The WTO 
represents for them a welcome rejection of irredentism, and the establishment of a global 
community of trade that ignores ethnic and historical divisions.  Protectionism has its 
strongest roots in irredentism.  Which comes first, the constitutional governance 
structures or the social feeling in which the governance structures must be rooted?  They 
clearly have a dialectical relationship, but the force is not always centripetal.
In the U.S., the Commerce Clause of the  Constitution serves a dual negative 
integration and positive integration role.  The “negative” or dormant Commerce Clause is 
used by courts to strike down state legislation that interferes inappropriately with 
interstate commerce.  The “positive” Commerce Clause authorizes federal legislative 
power to regulate interstate commerce.  Interestingly, in this context of the same textual 
provision, the positive power has, through judicial acceptance, far outstripped the 
negative discipline.  That is, the federal government’s power to legislate, limited only by 
the identification of a plausible interstate commerce relationship or effect, is far broader 
than the scope of state measures that will be found to violate the negative Commerce 
Clause.  The EC also combines negative integration power with positive integration 
power, although the positive integration power is somewhat narrower than that which 
exists in the U.S.  
The WTO, on the other hand, generally requires consensus or unanimity, 
depending on the context and the informal modifications of the formal rules, in order to 
engage in positive integration.  In this sense, it might be said that the WTO has 
substantial negative integration power, but lacks substantial positive integration power.  It 
is not a “member organization” when it comes to negative integration, but certainly is 
when it comes to positive integration.  
If the imbalance between adjudicative power and legislative power, and between 
trade values and other values, were addressed by enhanced legislative power at the WTO, 
another concern would be exacerbated:  the concern for democratic accountability at the 
WTO. 27 Increased legislative power could take the form of majority, or supermajority, 
voting at the WTO.  
The democracy deficit in international organizations is in substance a combined 
question of the degree of distance from parliamentary accountability, and subsidiarity.  
From a constitutional economics perspective, democracy plays an important instrumental 
role in enhancing the revelation of preferences expressed through the democratic process, 
27 See Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451, 458 
(2001); Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: 
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment 
Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 84-90 (2001).
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and in enhancing the fidelity of governmental operatives as agents of citizens.  Thus, the 
WTO’s own democracy deficit could be addressed by enhancing parliamentary 
accountability at the WTO, either by making domestic arrangements for greater domestic 
parliamentary involvement in WTO legislation, or through a WTO parliamentary body.  
Here, it is necessary to link the WTO’s constitution to its member states’ 
constitutions.  To the extent that the WTO is truly a “member organization”—an 
international as opposed to transnational organization—perhaps the democracy deficit 
critique is misguided, and the real question is one of member state democracy.  Or if 
some member states lack influence in the WTO, perhaps the democracy deficit would be 
addressed through national empowerment, rather than the addition of parliamentary 
control at the WTO level.  Furthermore, the WTO’s democracy deficit is caused by the 
scope of subject matters the WTO addresses:  this democracy deficit could be addressed 
by reducing the scope of WTO action.  But even with more democracy at the WTO, the 
question would still remain whether the WTO is the right place to address particular 
issues.  This is the question of subsidiarity.  
Voting arrangements may be analyzed through the lens of constitutional 
economics.  Voting arrangements are initially understood as mechanisms of 
accountability; ensuring that the governmental agent  is accountable to its constituents.  
But how do we explain majority voting?  As suggested above, majority voting arises in 
contexts of veils of uncertainty, where the parties are unable to determine ex ante whether 
agreeing to majority voting will harm them or hurt them, or whether surplus created by a 
move to majority voting will be distributed largely to them or largely to other 
constituents.  
 Broader groups of issues under a single majority voting umbrella may enhance 
the possibility of constructive uncertainty.  This suggests that interfunctional 
constitutions may provide ex ante uncertainty as to the likely outcome of majority voting, 
possibly making a move to majority voting more likely.  
Legal Constitutions
Legal constitutions have two components:  assignment of legislative capacity, and 
judicial review.  Secondary legal rules—constitutional rules—are the handmaiden of the 
economic, political and social forces that form the substance of social interaction.  
However, legal rules are both products and producers of constitutional change.  For 
example, certain kinds of constitutional development may lead to demand for more 
constitutional development.  The surprising 1994 advance in binding dispute settlement 
has created a perceived imbalance between dispute settlement and treaty-making:  
between adjudication and legislation.  Treaty-making is difficult, because as a practical 
matter it requires unanimity to amend the WTO treaties, or to make new treaties.  
Some of the gaps in the agreements previously agreed are filled by adjudication.  
Some of these gaps seem to have constitutional dimensions, such as the role of judicial 
review in balance of payments cases, or the ability to incorporate into WTO law 
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standards produced at Codex Alimentarius by majority voting.  (Codex Alimentarius was 
created in 1963 by the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Health 
Organization to develop food standards.)  While the WTO Appellate Body has been 
prudent and has avoided extensive “judicial legislation,”28 or judicial centralism, it has 
been required to decide the cases presented to it, and many of these cases have involved 
matters the negotiators never considered, or matters they considered and failed to resolve.  
It would be politically impossible, and patently undesirable, to accord to the WTO 
broad majority voting-based legislative power similar to that held by domestic 
legislatures.  However, it might be possible to accord narrower legislative, or quasi-
legislative, power to the WTO, especially in some of the contexts where the alternative to 
international legislation is international adjudication.  
The WTO agreements contain nuances that show the beginning of narrow 
legislative capacity, not within the WTO itself, but incorporated into the WTO from other 
international bodies.  One of the most important examples is the reference in WTO law to 
international standards, such as those produced by Codex Alimentarius, or the 
International Standards Organization, in the WTO agreements.  In the WTO Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (human, animal and plant health) Measures, and in the 
WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, domestic product standards are 
required, with certain important exceptions, to be based on international standards, and 
domestic measures that conform to international standards are provided substantial 
protection from scrutiny as potential illegal trade barriers.  In the Sardines case decided 
by the WTO Appellate Body under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, even 
Codex Alimentarius rules produced by majority vote had this effect.29
These types of quasi-legislation, delegated by the WTO to these other bodies, 
present important questions about democratic accountability, and about the capacity of 
developing states to participate.  However, as more circumstances arise where it seems 
useful in trade terms to develop some quasi-legislative capacity in order to balance 
adjudicative capacity, to promote inter-sectoral coherence or to advance free trade, we 
may see some constitutional moments—small or large—that will develop greater 
legislative capacity at the WTO.
The U.S. and the EU have the internal experience of judicial constitutionalization.  
The European Court of Justice developed doctrines of supremacy, preemption, direct 
effect and judicial review in a way that gave impetus to political integration and, 
eventually, constitutional amendment.30  Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the European 
28 See Richard Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:  Discursive, Constitutional, 
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004).
29
   European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 
23 October 2002.
30
   J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1991); Arie Reich, 
From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 
NORTHW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 775 (1997).
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Court of Justice showed themselves to be keenly aware of the relative need and political 
appetite for constitutionalization of this type.  They have grasped constitutional moments.  
The WTO Appellate Body has had only limited experience, but has demonstrated a 
similar sensitivity in such decisions as India-Quantitative Restrictions, regarding the 
balance between political and judicial decision-making.
One of the signal features of legal constitutionalization is understood by many to 
be direct effect.  Direct effect, of course, is not necessarily a relevant feature in domestic 
constitutionalization, but it may have significance in an international setting, and was an 
important feature of the development of the EC constitution.  Direct effect actually 
involves the integration of levels:  the utilization by international legal rules of the more 
binding dispute settlement available in domestic law.  By finding that EC law had direct 
effect in the courts of member states, the ECJ both gave EC law greater binding effect 
and gave individuals greater control over the development of EC law.31
The selection of areas and rules for incorporation in the WTO legal system entails 
a kind of dynamic subsidiarity.   That is, through specific adjudication and legislative 
action, there is a dynamic division of authority between states and the WTO itself.32  This 
division can adjust to changing needs, technologies and social structures over time.  The 
WTO constitution includes additional dynamic features, such as the relationship between 
horizontal and vertical federalism, and the institutional balance between dispute 
settlement and adjudication.  
Legal constitutions allocate authority, including legislative power, and may be 
assumed to do so in a manner that maximizes opportunities for preference-maximizing 
arrangements through majority voting or other legislative techniques.  Legal constitutions 
may also assist functional constitutions by referring quasi-legislative authority, such as 
that accorded the Codex Alimentarius by the SPS Agreement, to external functional 
organizations.  Legal constitutions may further assist functional constitutionalization
through judicial referral of issues, either directly or through interpretation, to external 
functional organizations or other external sources of functional law.  Allocation of 
discretion to judges provides implicit authorization for this type of referral.33
Judicial constitutionalization is also explicable in terms of constitutional 
economics.  In these terms, it is not surprising that states would explicitly or implicitly 
delegate authority to judges, either to interpret or develop law, or to apply their normative 
outlook to particular contexts as they may arise.  
31 See Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 24 (describing the bases for evaluating the 
utility of “direct effect” of WTO law).  
32 See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
Subsidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 32 (1998).
33 See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
333 (1999).
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Finally, while the WTO may internally have a constitutional structure, the broader 
international legal system has one as well.  Moreover, other functional entities, such as 
the EU, the IMF, UNEP, etc., have constitutional structures also.  We might consider a 
special kind of secondary rule, or a tertiary rule, that allocates authority among 
constitutional structures.  Indeed, we might observe a kind of global functional 
federalism, in which the center is the general international legal system and the periphery 
is the functional organization.  It is not clear where ultimate power lies.  So, as in the 
EU, a nuanced constitutional dialog between the center and the periphery may emerge.  
Human Rights Constitutions
The WTO will not soon, and may never, embody the kind of human rights order 
that individuals hope for in our domestic societies.  The critical issue here regards the 
vocation of the WTO, and its advantage compared to states themselves, human rights 
treaties, the United Nations and other bodies.  In domestic societies, constitutionalism 
entails a normative commitment to the rule of law, minority rights, and other human 
rights.  Subsidiarity would suggest that most aspects of these values can normally be 
decided and provided well at the level of the state.  A kind of functional subsidiarity 
would suggest that even where the state is inadequate to protect human rights, the WTO 
may not be the multilateral place to house human rights efforts.34  However, the WTO or 
other multilateral organizations may become involved in linkages or conditionality 
relating to these types of issues.   
Just as the EU’s constitutional evolution has required the delicately negotiated 
insertion of human rights sensibilities and norms, so too will the WTO’s evolution 
require human rights-type constraints.  Some argue that this has already occurred by 
virtue of the fact that WTO law is part of the general international legal system.35
However, while states are not generally relieved by WTO law of their human rights 
obligations, the internal WTO dispute settlement system does not provide for the general 
application of human rights law to modify WTO law.  In order to provide for a more 
nuanced integration between WTO law and human rights law within WTO dispute 
settlement, constitutional changes in WTO law would be required.  In effect, the WTO 
dispute settlement system, created to put to an end the regime of auto-interpretation in 
connection with WTO law, would require a broader mandate than the one that presently 
exists.
Here again, it is necessary to consider the big picture.  That is, the WTO 
constitution exists within the broader international legal system, and therefore benefits 
34 See Armin von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organization?  
Human Rights and the Core of the European Union, 37 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1307, 1337 
(2000) (suggesting that not all organizations need to be imbued with human rights 
competence). See also Trachtman, supra note 6.
35 See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:  HOW 
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University 
Press 2003).
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from the human rights system that exists.  And so, within the broader international legal 
system, there is a significant human rights dimension.  This human rights dimension of 
the broader global constitution complements and supports the WTO constitution.  We 
must also recognize the role played by domestic constitutions in supplying the human 
rights dimension.  
Human rights constitutions can be explained in the language of constitutional 
economics.  Modeling constitutions as entered into under Harsanyian veils of uncertainty, 
certain human rights provisions may make sense to protect individuals, who may ex post 
find themselves in the minority, from abuse by the majority.  Human rights may also be 
understood in distributive terms, as redistributive claims.  This is easiest to see in 
connection with certain economic and social rights, such as the right to development or 
the right to health.  But it is also true with respect to certain other kinds of rights in the 
sense, and to the extent, that these rights may be exchanged for wealth or other values.  
Redistribution 
We must also recognize that constitutions have distributive effects and may serve 
redistributive functions.  For example, constitutions may produce the kind of solidarity 
that can serve as the basis for redistribution.  Even the rights established by domestic 
constitutions may be understood as claims for redistribution.  The WTO is an engine for 
creating global wealth.  It has not yet confronted directly questions regarding the global 
distribution of its benefits, although the Cancun demarche of cotton-producing countries 
Benin, Burkina-Faso, Chad, and Mali may be seen as the opening move in direct 
confrontation.  And of course, such demands are powerfully expressed in the broader 
international legal system.  
Every society needs a mechanism by which to express solidarity with those who 
are in need, especially those whose need results from the structure of society itself.  This 
is the teaching of Polanyi and Ruggie:  the political need for a liberalism that is 
embedded in a redistributive regulatory structure.36
The WTO is both a result and a cause of greater global interdependence, and of 
the development of global society.  To avoid disruption of this global society, by 
demarches in trade, economic catastrophes or violent upheavals in member states, or 
36
   John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379 (1982). Ruggie 
modernizes and adapts a perspective earlier elucidated by KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (Beacon Press 
1944). Dani Rodrik has considered the application of this perspective to modern global 
markets. DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 7 (1999). See also Robert 
L. Howse, From Politics To Technocracy – and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral 
Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 94 (2002).
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terrorism, it is morally and politically necessary to develop mechanisms to enhance the 
position of the poor.37
Constitutional reforms may be a necessary part of a redistributive settlement at the
WTO.    These constitutional reforms may include a modification of decision-making that 
would provide more power to the poor, or the establishment of rights that effect 
redistribution to the poor.  At the WTO, the main focus for the poor in the near future will 
be on mechanisms to produce greater liberalization in sectors in which the poor could 
compete.  While this type of broadening of the scope of competition is central to the 
WTO project, it has been frustrated in the past by differentials in power and engagement.  
Constructing the Elephants
Let us begin to place some connective tissue on these components of 
constitutionalization.  The main source of analytical connective tissue, already described 
above, is constitutional economics, based on methodological and normative 
individualism.  Each type of constitution described above is seen through this lens as a 
means of achieving individual preferences.  
Constitutional economics is, of course, not limited to economic constitutions.  
Rather, it is an analytical technique that may encompass any type of preference, including 
human rights, environmental preservation, nationalism and political accountability and 
redistribution.  So, constitutional economics examines each type of constitution through 
the same lens:  maximizing individual preferences.  This does not mean that the 
constitutional economics analysis is simple.  To the contrary, a constitutional economics 
analysis allows us to place in context each of the values—whether they are process-based 
or substantive values—in order to determine how they might be integrated with one 
another, and in order to evaluate them.  
Constitutional economics, like economics in general, is agnostic as to the types of 
preferences that will be articulated, or the way that individuals will value each 
preference.  It assumes only that each individual has different preferences and enters 
society in order to maximize these preferences.   
Therefore, constitutional economics does not accept preemptive values such as 
human rights, environmental protection, or wealth maximization.  It would accept that 
some of these preferences are valued more greatly than others.  For example, it may 
understand core human rights as preferences that are so highly valued that they rarely are 
trumped by other values.  
We recognize that there are good reasons for international trade agreements, and 
that these agreements may have constitutional dimensions.  In constitutional economics 
37
   Joel P. Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at the WTO:  Trade Law and 
“Global Apartheid,” 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2003).
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terms, at the outset, it may be valuable to allocate some legislative power, and judicial 
review-type power, to a centralized institution.  
One critical constitutional feature is a type of dynamic subsidiarity that may allow 
shifts in allocations of power over time, or that may allow for contingent allocations that
only arise under specified conditions.  We can see modest and nuanced legislative 
capacity within the WTO, and shared between the WTO and other functional 
organizations.  The WTO already has significant “judicial review” functions with respect 
to member state measures, although again it is important to recognize that the scope of 
this judicial review is determined, and limited, by the substantive legal norm applied:  
national treatment, least trade restrictive alternative, requirement for scientific basis, or 
otherwise.  
Economic constitutions in this sense collide with interfunctional constitutions and 
human rights constitutions.  The scope for WTO-based legislation, and adjudication, both 
legally and politically, is constrained by other values that are articulated elsewhere, or 
that are articulated within WTO law or WTO negotiations.  After all, the WTO is a 
member organization and states would not be expected to agree at the WTO to do 
something that they reject elsewhere.  
The degree of “coherence” between other values and those expressed more 
directly in WTO law depends on the specificity of arrangements for legislative or judicial 
integration of values.  These arrangements may be made within the WTO or in the 
broader international legal system.  To the extent that these arrangements are made 
through dispute settlement, it must be recognized that judges will be accorded authority 
to make important trade-offs between values.  While this may take place without incident 
in some domestic systems, it may be a challenge to the legitimacy of the WTO judicial 
function.38
Challenges to the judicial function may be alleviated by allocation of greater 
competence to the legislative function in international society.  While the general 
international legal system has, in a sense, plenary legislative authority—there are no 
fields which seem outside the jurisdiction of international law, provided that states 
consent—its legislative capacity is limited by the general requirement of individual state 
consent.  So, it may be that greater adjudicative attempts to deal with the problem of 
coherence may lead to greater demands for majority voting or other means to overcome 
strategic problems raised by the requirement of individual state consent.  Of course, with 
greater legislative capacity will come a greater need for democratic accountability.  Here, 
the question that must be asked is whether and to what extent centralized parliamentary 
structures can and should be established to provide centralized accountability.  
Interfunctional constitutions may also contribute to the making, and the 
enforcement, of economic constitutions.  They may because the possibility of a wider 
scope for treaty-making bargaining may increase the scope of possible arrangements.  
38
   Trachtman, supra note 33.
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Furthermore, a wider scope of coverage may result in greater enforceability of the 
relevant treaty.39  It is also necessary to recognize that human rights and redistribution are 
special forms of interfunctional constitutional arrangements.  According to the theory of 
embedded liberalism, these, and perhaps other regulatory structures are necessary 
features of stable economic constitutions.  Furthermore, we might understand some of 
these interfunctional issues as relating to the concept of “collective preferences” recently 
popularized by the European Union.  In a sense, all preferences expressed through 
governmental action should be collective preferences:  shared preferences that are 
appropriately expressed through government, rather than through the market.    
We might say that claims for human rights and claims for redistribution are 
similar in some respects to other kinds of non-trade values.  Some claims for human 
rights might even be understood as implicit claims for redistribution.  However, in a 
constitutional economics framework, some claims for human rights must be understood 
as pre-emptive in their value and force—while they are theoretically subject to trade-offs, 
they are so highly valued as to be unlikely to be sacrificed in any particular case.  
Redistribution is of a different order.  From an embedded liberalism standpoint, 
we might find that the price of an economic constitution is the establishment of a 
redistributive constitution.  From a Rawlsian perspective, we might find that the 
establishment of economic and other forms of constitution form the community basis for 
the operation of the difference principle, validating claims for redistribution.40
The Elephant and the Responsible Organization:  Justifying the WTO Constitution 
Project
The WTO’s constitution is malleable.  We must steer between the Scylla of false 
limitation assumed by those who say the WTO can never have a constitution, and the 
Charybdis of those who would use constitutional discourse artificially to constrain certain 
claims, and ask instead what are the socially desirable areas of development and how do 
these areas of development relate to one another.  The goal of this essay has been to begin 
to describe some of the bases and dynamics of change, and to promote a dialog of 
possibility, rather than one of false limitation.  
To the extent that the WTO is understood as a “member-driven organization,” we 
must look to member states as the parties responsible for continuing problems.  However, 
these member states experience difficult collective action problems under regimes of 
unanimous approval of new treaties or treaty amendments.  In order to resolve these 
problems and move forward to create arrangements that benefit individual WTO 
constituents, it may become necessary to extend the constitution of the WTO, and its 
responsibility.  
39 See George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law 
Supergame:  Order and Law, forthcoming.
40
   Joel P. Trachtman, Legal Aspects of a Poverty Agenda at the WTO:  Trade Law and 
“Global Apartheid,” 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2003).
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It is clear that the six constitutional dimensions of the WTO presented above—
economic, human rights, functional, legal, political and redistributive—interact with one 
another.  They both impose constraints on one another and call for advances in one 
another—they are part of a larger system, an integrated organism.  Of course, the WTO 
will never be a state, but it will change along these dimensions, in response to the 
changing needs of society.  Yet the WTO competes, along vertical and horizontal 
dimensions.  It competes on a vertical dimension with the state and with the general 
international legal order.  It competes along a horizontal dimension with other functional 
organizations.41  This competition may be beneficial from a constitutional economics 
perspective, to the extent that it may result in a nuanced institutional structure that 
maximizes achievement of individual preferences.  
Constitutional design of the WTO will respond to constitutional moments:  to 
moments in which it is clear to states that they can benefit broadly from institutional 
change, without a clear understanding of the precise distributive consequences of the 
change.  This paper suggests that constitutional change may proceed along a number of 
dimensions, and in a number of different institutional settings.  This paper has begun to 
suggest some of the relationships among these different dimensions and settings.  It has 
done so not to advance a particular constitutional structure or agenda, but to suggest the 
complexity of the analytical project.  
*   *   *
41
    Trachtman, supra note 6.  
